A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies

Analysis of spectrum allocation policies in the economics literature focuses on competitive bidding for wireless licenses. Auctions generating high bids, as in Germany and the UK, are identified as "successful," while those producing lower receipts, as in Switzerland and the Netherlands, are deemed "fiascoes." Yet, even full and costless extraction of license rents does not map directly to social welfare, because spectrum policies creating rents impose social costs. For example, rules favoring monopoly market structure predictably increase license values, but reduce welfare. This paper attempts to shift analytical focus to the relationship between spectrum policy (including license auctions) and efficiency in output markets. In cross-country comparisons of performance metrics in mobile telephone service markets, empirical estimates suggest that countries that auction licenses do not achieve lower prices or higher levels of output than other nations. Rather, countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures realize demonstrable social welfare benefits. These gains generally dominate efficiencies associated with license sales. Policies to increase auction revenues, such as reservation prices and subsidies for weak bidders, should be evaluated in this light.

What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design

Since initiated in the U.S. in July 1994, auctions have replaced "beauty contests" in the assignment of wireless licenses in many countries. Economists have been involved in constructing the competitive bidding mechanisms chosen, and have devoted considerable analysis to the problems involved. Generally, auction methods have been evaluated according to the receipts generated; social gains resulting from the displacement of activity-distorting taxes has motivated the welfare analysis. Yet, policies widely advocated by economists to intensify license bidding , such as reservation prices or bidding credits for "weak"' bidders , may impose deadweight losses that dominate revenue raising efficiencies. Yet, retail market effects are largely excluded from cost-benefit calculations of rules to assign licenses. This paper reviews a number of case studies suggesting that economic analysis is most usefully focused on consumer welfare in wireless service markets, the outputs resulting from license use. Econometric evidence from mobile phone markets in twenty-nine countries suggests that auctions do not lower prices or increase usage, while liberalization, increased spectrum allocations and more competitive markets -- produces such pro-consumer results. We use simulations to compare the net social benefits of liberalization against policies suggested in the auction literature to enhance license bids. We argue that increases in bandwidth and competitiveness produce consumer benefits that generally dominate social gains from rent extraction via wireless license auctions.

Development of the CMS detector for the CERN LHC Run 3

International audienceSince the initial data taking of the CERN LHC, the CMS experiment has undergone substantial upgrades and improvements. This paper discusses the CMS detector as it is configured for the third data-taking period of the CERN LHC, Run 3, which started in 2022. The entire silicon pixel tracking detector was replaced. A new powering system for the superconducting solenoid was installed. The electronics of the hadron calorimeter was upgraded. All the muon electronic systems were upgraded, and new muon detector stations were added, including a gas electron multiplier detector. The precision proton spectrometer was upgraded. The dedicated luminosity detectors and the beam loss monitor were refurbished. Substantial improvements to the trigger, data acquisition, software, and computing systems were also implemented, including a new hybrid CPU/GPU farm for the high-level trigger

Development of the CMS detector for the CERN LHC Run 3

International audienceSince the initial data taking of the CERN LHC, the CMS experiment has undergone substantial upgrades and improvements. This paper discusses the CMS detector as it is configured for the third data-taking period of the CERN LHC, Run 3, which started in 2022. The entire silicon pixel tracking detector was replaced. A new powering system for the superconducting solenoid was installed. The electronics of the hadron calorimeter was upgraded. All the muon electronic systems were upgraded, and new muon detector stations were added, including a gas electron multiplier detector. The precision proton spectrometer was upgraded. The dedicated luminosity detectors and the beam loss monitor were refurbished. Substantial improvements to the trigger, data acquisition, software, and computing systems were also implemented, including a new hybrid CPU/GPU farm for the high-level trigger

Development of the CMS detector for the CERN LHC Run 3

International audienceSince the initial data taking of the CERN LHC, the CMS experiment has undergone substantial upgrades and improvements. This paper discusses the CMS detector as it is configured for the third data-taking period of the CERN LHC, Run 3, which started in 2022. The entire silicon pixel tracking detector was replaced. A new powering system for the superconducting solenoid was installed. The electronics of the hadron calorimeter was upgraded. All the muon electronic systems were upgraded, and new muon detector stations were added, including a gas electron multiplier detector. The precision proton spectrometer was upgraded. The dedicated luminosity detectors and the beam loss monitor were refurbished. Substantial improvements to the trigger, data acquisition, software, and computing systems were also implemented, including a new hybrid CPU/GPU farm for the high-level trigger